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the value of their tax deductions for gifts of stock of their firms. These
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games. We also find that stock prices rise abnormally about 6% during the
one-year period before the gift date and fall abnormally by about 5%
during the one year after the gift date, supporting the likelihood these
games are in play. In addition, this pattern is stronger for gifts for which
there is a reporting lag, also consistent with illicit behaviors. We therefore
suggest policy recommendations that should improve the compliance of
gifts with the requirements of anti-fraud provisions of federal securities
laws.
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INTRODUCTION
Studies have shown that corporate insiders tend to make favorable
charitable gifts just prior to a severe decline in the company’s share prices.1
The timing of these gifts is troubling; it suggests that the corporate insiders
may have acted using material, non-public information to reap an unfair
benefit. Many of these donations were made at a time when it would have
been illegal to make a sale of the same securities due to their access to this
information.
To explore whether these timing games may be played across the
1. See David Yermack, Deductio Ad Absurdum: CEOs Donating Their Own Stock to
Their Own Family Foundations, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 107, 107-08 (2009)(studying large gifts of
stock by Chairmen and CEOs of public companies to their own private family foundations).
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board generally and whether these manipulations continue to this day, we
analyze the timing of gifts of common stock by corporate executives using
a comprehensive dataset covering 1986-2014. Specifically, we investigate
five non-mutually-exclusive hypotheses for executives’ behavior regarding
the timing of gifts in their own firms’ stock: 1) wait until after the stock has
appreciated naturally to maximize their donation as well as their tax
deduction (passive-timing); 2) accelerate the announcement of good news
prior to the gifts to further increase their donation and tax deductions
(spring-loading); 3) delay the release of bad news until after the gifting of
the stock to again increase their donation as well as tax deductions (bulletdodging); 4) backdate the gift date in order to maximize their donation and
tax deductions (backdating); and 5) use material, undisclosed inside
information about the future prospects of their own firms stock to
maximize their donation and tax deductions (inside information).
Unlike previous studies that use a very limited sample of firms or time
periods, we investigate these hypotheses by utilizing a comprehensive
database that includes all gifts of common stock where executives donate
the stock of their own firms, in all publicly listed firms in the United States.
Our dataset covers all reported gifts of common stock and contains over
200,000 observations. The total volume of gifts contained in our dataset is
approximately 9.5 billion shares, with a dollar value of approximately $300
billion. Consequently, our findings are general and apply to all executives’
gifts of their firms’ stock. Given the large dollar volume of gifts covered
and the comprehensive nature of the study, our findings are important from
legal, economic, and public policy perspectives.
Overall, we find that gifts are well-timed over the time period of 19862014. Our research demonstrates that each of our five hypotheses explains
at least some of the timing behavior of gift-giving of stock in the United
States during this time period. Stock prices rise abnormally about 6%
during the one-year period before the gift date and they fall abnormally by
about 5% during the one year after the gift date. We find this pattern is
stronger for late-reported gifts, which is consistent with the fraudulent
backdating hypothesis. We also find that almost two-thirds of gifts are
reported late, taking advantage of an exception in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 (SOX),2 further contributing to the lax regulatory conditions that
make it easy to manipulate the timing of gifts. We suggest policy
recommendations that should improve the compliance of gifts with the
requirements of SOX as well as general anti-fraud provisions of federal
securities laws.

2. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)
(codified in sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.).
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Our finding that executives’ gifts are well-timed has economic and
policy implications for the federal tax laws as well. Under U.S. tax law,
the donor of gifts of stock to public or private charitable foundations may
obtain a personal income tax deduction for the market value of the shares
while simultaneously avoiding the capital gains tax that would be due if the
shares were sold.3 Furthermore, although open market sales of stock are
undoubtedly within the purview of federal insider trading law, whether
stock gifts to charity are so constrained is an unresolved question.4 These
loopholes create an opportunity for exploitation: empirical evidence
suggests that corporate insiders use their access to inside information to
time their stock donations prior to price declines and thereby increase their
federal income tax deductions.5
To address these issues, this paper proceeds as follows. Section I
offers, by way of background, a discussion of previous studies on
executives’ gifts of common stock. Section II analyzes the legal issues
presented by timing gifts of stock. Section III contains our empirical
findings together with the legal implications of those findings. In Section
IV we offer proposals for reform followed by our concluding remarks.
I.

BACKGROUND – PREVIOUS STUDIES

Three types of motivation determine an individual’s desire to donate.6
The intrinsic motivation represents the subjective value of donating for its
own sake, which is shaped by the individual’s altruism and other private
preferences.7 The extrinsic motivation is related to external benefits gained
from donations.8 Image (signaling) motivation links to the individual’s
desire to be positively perceived by others, which affects both the
individual’s reputation with others and her own self-esteem.9 Finance
3. Suppose that a stock purchased at $100 was gifted when the stock price reached
$200 and subsequently, the stock price declined back to $50 after the gifting. In this case,
the individual can take a deduction for $200 instead of holding a share worth $50.
4. Yermack, supra note 1, at 107.
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Incentives and Prosocial Behavior, 96
AM. ECON. REV. 1652, 1652-53 (2006) [hereinafter Bénabou & Tirole, Prosocial Behavior].
7. Dan Ariely et al., Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and Monetary
Incentives in Behaving Prosocially, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 544, 544 (2009).
8. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation, 70 REV. ECON.
STUD. 489, 492 (2003). Extrinsic motivation is often described as a reinforcement
mechanism or contingent reward in behavioral economics and human resources
management literature.
9. Bénabou & Tirole, Prosocial Behavior, supra note 6, at 1653-54. See also Zachary
Grossman, Self-Signaling Versus Social-Signaling in Giving 1-2 (Nov. 4, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript) (describing how social signaling, actions taken to influence
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literature basically seeks answers for the second motive.
Studies on charitable gifting have focused on the income and price
elasticities of donations.10 One of the earlier studies on this topic,
conducted by Professors Martin Feldstein and Amy Taylor, explores
income tax benefits of donations by analyzing special tax returns filed in
1962 and 1970.11 The study concludes that tax deductibility of donations
provides an efficient subsidy for charities.12 Alternative tax policies
affecting the volume and distribution of gifts and distribution of tax
liabilities, and net disposable income among donors and donees, are
important determinants of donations as well as matters of public policy.13
others’ perceptions of oneself, and self-signaling, “efforts to maintain positive beliefs about
oneself,” underscore image motivation in the context of giving).
10. See, e.g., Auten et al., infra note 13, at 371 (using panel data to analyze elasticity of
giving); Daniel Feenberg, Are Tax Price Models Really Identified: The Case of Charitable
Giving, 42 NAT’L TAX J. 629, 629 (1987) (creating a microeconometric analysis of
charitable contributions); Feinstein & Taylor, infra note 11, at 1201 (stating that charitable
gifts are an important source of finance); Martin Feldstein & Charles Clotfelter, Tax
Incentives and Charitable Contributions in the United States: A Microeconometric Analysis,
J. PUB. ECON. 1, 2 (1976) (discussing the controversy of how tax rules influence charitable
gifts); Randolph, infra note 13, at 1 (presenting evidence of price and income elasticity);
Michael K. Taussig, Economic Aspects of the Personal Income Tax Treatment of Charitable
Contributions, 20 NAT’L TAX J. 1, 1 (1967) (emphasizing the importance of tax deductible
gifts); Laura Tiehen, Tax Policy and Charitable Contributions of Money, 54 NAT’L TAX J.
707, 707 (2001) (estimating price and income elasticities of charitable giving).
11. Martin Feldstein & Amy Taylor, The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions, 44
ECONOMETRøCA 1201, 1201 (1976). In the 1970s, the charitable tax break was generally
equivalent to the fair market value of the donated item(s), just like today. Id. at 1203.
However, the federal income tax marginal rates have varied significantly over the past halfcentury, arguably affecting the prevalence of, and trends in, charitable giving. See List,
infra note 12, at 170 (discussing how marginal tax rate variations over the past
administrations were accompanied by “changes in the charitable deduction caps” – a
phenomenon in which “changes in tax deductibility represent another source of variation
that can affect giving.”).
12. That is, charitable giving is “price elastic” – the marginal benefits of giving (the
value of donations charities receive) exceed the marginal costs (lost tax revenue). John A.
List, The Market for Charitable Giving, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 157, 169-70 (2011).
13. Studies typically support the importance of tax policy on donor behavior. Although
they suggest other factors affecting donor behavior exist, studies have provided conflicting
evidence about the relative significance of these factors. For example, Professor William
Randolph finds evidence that income elasticity is important, and because people have a
tendency to smooth their consumption over time, the volume of donations is affected by
transitory income elasticity as well as permanent price elasticity. William C. Randolph,
Dynamic Income, Progressive Taxes, and the Timing of Charitable Contributions, 103 J.
POL. ECON. 709, 710 (1995). On the other hand, Professor Gerald Auten and colleagues
argue that transitory income and tax effects have no impact on gift-giving behavior – what
matters are the persistent tax and income effects. Since tax policies have long-lasting
effects on company income level, they are the most important elements determining the
amount and timing of donations. Entities adjust donations more on based on tax regulation
than on income shocks. See Gerald E. Auten et al., Charitable Giving, Income, and Taxes:
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Very few studies have looked specifically at CEOs’ stock gifts. Four
studies are relevant to note: the first conducted by Yang Ho Kim and ManU Lee,14 the second by Woon-Oh Jung and Sung Ook Park,15 the third by
David Yermack16 and the last by Sudip Ghosh and Maretno A. Harjoto.17
In the first paper, Professors Kim and Lee examine the transfers and
subsequent cancellations of stock gifts in the period between 1993 and
2002 by South Korean controlling shareholders attempting to minimize
their gift tax.18 They discover that prior to 2000, executives donated stocks
to their families on the days they estimated that the stock prices would be at
local minimums.19 If stock prices continued to decline after the donation
dates, executives cancelled the gifts.20 After a more restrictive gift-tax
valuation rule for stock gifts was enacted in Korea in 2000, however, the
incidence of this form of passive timing manipulation decreased
significantly.21 Professors Jung and Park, in the second study, analyze
stock gifts of controlling shareholders to their families in Korea for the
2000-2004 period. Their study finds that companies would depress their
stock prices close to these transfer dates by disclosing negative news to or
withholding positive news from the market, thereby reducing the donor’s
gift taxes.22 In the third study, Professor Yermack considers 150 stock gifts
made by public company Chairmen and CEOs to their family charities in
the U.S.,23 and finds inflated stock prices around the days of gift. Increased
stock prices provide income tax shields, and an opportunity to offset capital

An Analysis of Panel Data, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 371, 372 (2002) (discussing empirical data
on charitable giving with special emphasis on the effects of taxes).
14. Yang Ho Kim & Man-U Lee, A Study on the Gift Time Management of Listed
Stocks, 20 KOR. J. TAX’N RES. 57 (2003). Because this article is published in Korean, we
refer to Jung & Park, infra note 18, for a helpful description of its contents.
15. Woon-Oh Jung & Sung-Ook Park, Do Controlling Shareholders Manage the
Timing of Information Disclosure When Making a Stock Gift?, 39 ASøA-PAC. J. FøN. STUD.
831 (2009).
16. Yermack, supra note 1.
17. Sudip Ghosh & Maretno A. Harjoto, Insiders’ Personal Stock Donations from the
Lens of Stakeholder, Stewardship and Agency Theories, 20 BUS. ETHøCS: A EUR. REV. 342
(2011).
18. Jung & Park, supra note 15, at 835.
19. Id. at 835-36.
20. Id. at 836.
21. Prior to 1997, the Korean valuation rule for gifts of stock was the closing market
price on the gift date. In 1997, this changed to the average of the daily closing prices over
the three-month period prior to the gift date. In 2000, the rule became the average market
price in the two months before and two months after the gift date. Id. at 834. This is the
rule in force as of 2014. For more details on these rules, see MINISTRY OF STRATEGY & FIN.,
S. KOR., KOREAN TAXATION 163 (2014).
22. Jung & Park, supra note 15, at 858.
23. Yermack, supra note 1, at 108.
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gains yields to donors in the U.S. In the last study, Professors Ghosh and
Harjoto find price movements in the U.S. market similar to those described
in Professor Yermack’s study. Executives time their donations to benefit
from tax advantages.
The motivations that affect stock prices around gift dates in Korea are
different from those that affect such prices in the U.S. Historically, most
Korean companies were effectively managed by their controlling
shareholders and their families,24 and aspects of the huge, multiconglomerate, family-controlled “chaebol” system still persist today.25
Controlling families maximize and propagate their personal wealth by
donating shares to their children.26 However, the extremity of inheritance
and gift taxes, which reaches a maximum at 50% in Korea, forces
executives to look for astute ways to protect their level of wealth.27
Professors Kim and Lee document that before the Korean law began to use
time periods after the gift date to calculate the gift tax on stock gifts,
executives gave stocks to their families when they estimated the stock
prices would not drop further.28 In line with this policy, they cancelled
donations if stock prices continued to drop.29 This is a passive strategy:
executives do not change the timing of information disclosures, nor do they
attempt backdating in order to minimize stock prices around the date of
donation; rather, they appear to use their insider information to find the
most appropriate date.30
In 2000, Korean law changed the valuation base for assessing the gift
tax on a stock gift to the average market value of the underlying stock over
the four-month period encompassing the two months before and two
months after the gift date.31 Under this law, Korean executives might keep
stock prices low before and after gift dates. To test this hypothesis, Jung
24. See Jung & Park, supra note 15, at 831 (“[I]nvestigat[ing] whether Korean
controlling shareholders attempt to influence stock prices by managing the timing of
information disclosures when they transfer stocks to related parties as gifts.”).
25. See Charlotte M. Powers, The Changing Role of Chaebol: Multi-Conglomerates in
South Korea’s National Economy, 10 STAN. J. E. ASIAN AFF. 105, 105 (2010) (discussing
how “chaebols” are often seen as antiquated, but actually remain at the heart of South
Korea’s economic prosperity).
26. Jung & Park, supra note 15, at 832.
27. Id. (explaining how, in order to alleviate the “severe tax bites” from “crossgenerational stock transfers,” controlling shareholders are incentivized to “influence stock
prices during the period in which they transfer stock to related parties by gift.”).
28. Id. at 835-36 (“[Kim and Lee] discover[ed] that in the period before 2000 the
controlling shareholders of most firms chose gift dates to fall on the days when their stock
prices were perceived to be the lowest . . . .”).
29. Id. at 836.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 834.
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and Park analyze timing of information disclosures when company
executives made stock gifts.32 In accordance with the stock price valuation
period, they analyze the prices of stock starting from two months prior to
two months after the gift date. During the valuation period for a gifted
stock, its price would remain low, but after the valuation period ended, the
price would go up again.33 This suggests that Korean executives
consciously keep stock prices low during the valuation period of gifted
stocks so that donations seem less valuable. The study concludes that
executives delay good news and bring bad news forward during the
valuation period, and release good news only after the valuation period is
over.34 To control for possible endogeneity resulting from up and downmarkets, they compare donating firms with non-donating peers, and
conclude that their results are robust.35
In contrast, the American legal system provides incentives for U.S.
executives to make donations of stock gifts. First, U.S. executives are not
generally affected by a gift tax in the case of charitable contributions, and
the larger the value of their donation, the larger their tax benefit.36
Consequently, executives in the United States are interested in maximizing
the value of their stock donations, not minimizing them. Second, personal
stock gifts in the U.S. are exempted from at least some insider-trading laws
which would otherwise restrict their open market sales and purchases,
enabling executives to make stock gifts (as opposed to open market sales)
even during company blackout periods.37 Executives are also subject to
more relaxed reporting requirements (Form 5 instead of Form 4) with
respect to gifts, and the short-swing profit prohibitions of Section 16(b) do
not apply to gifts.
Stock gifts provide two additional types of benefits to managers.
They provide income tax deductions, and they offset the personal capital
gains tax owed if the shares were sold at a premium in lieu of donating
them. Thus, we should interpret the findings in U.S. studies in the light of
these facts.
Professor Yermack’s study considers 150 stock gifts made by public

32. Id. at 832.
33. Id. at 852.
34. Id. at 844-846 (discussing the study’s empirical results).
35. Id. at 851-57.
36. See 26 U.S.C. § 2522 (2015) (stating that charitable contributions are generally
deducted from the base for computing gift tax).
37. Yermack, supra note 1 at 107-08. See also Coles C. Bettis & M. Lemmon,
Corporate Policies Restricting Trading by Insiders, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 191, 199 (2000)
(analyzing corporate policies to regulate stock trading by insiders and how blackout periods
affect trading rates and profitability).
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company chairmen and CEOs to their family charities.38 He found that the
stock price creates a local maximum at the actual reported gift date, with
the stock price rising and falling by an irregular 3% in the two-month
period around that date.39 Yermack found a pattern of “excellent timing,”
observing that CEOs tend to donate shares following run-ups in their
companies’ stock prices.40 On average, the gift date coincided with a peak
in the stock price trajectory, with prices falling in the months after the date
of gift.41 Furthermore, this post-gift price drop was more dramatic for
larger gifts than for smaller ones, regardless of the methodology used to
calculate abnormal stock returns.42
Professor Yermack presents two possible explanations for the
favorable timing of these stock gifts. First, he suggests that this is the
result of insider information, wherein corporate insiders time their
donations of stock on the basis of material, non-public information in a
manner that will increase their personal income tax deductions.43
Executives may thus wait to donate stock just prior to negative earnings
announcements or just after positive ones.44 Second, he suggests that
perhaps the executives are backdating the date of the stock donation to
increase their tax deductions. Ex-post, CEOs may increase the value of
their tax deduction for charitable contributions by backdating the date of
their stock gifts to local peaks in the company’s stock price trajectories.45
Stock gift backdating is likely to violate IRS regulations, which look to the
date the stock gift is donated when assessing its value for tax purposes.46
Yermack found evidence consistent with both theories. The data
suggest CEOs are taking advance information about earnings releases into
account when choosing the timing of stock gifts.47 He noted a pattern
where some CEOs would make their donations just before negative
earnings announcements, and others would delay them until just after
positive announcements.48 Yermack also found evidence consistent with
the backdating of stock gifts by CEOs to their family foundations for gifts
38. Yermack, supra note 1, at 108.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 114.
42. Id. at 114-15.
43. Id. at 118-19.
44. Id. at 119.
45. Id.
46. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.170A-1(b) (2015) (stating that “[o]rdinarily, a contribution is
made at the time delivery is effected.”).
47. Yermack, supra note 1, at 108.
48. Id. (“Some CEOs made gifts of stock just before adverse quarterly earnings
announcements, a time when company blackout periods would almost always prohibit open
market sales.”).
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made outside the month of December.49 The data showed a positive
relationship between the favorable timing of CEO stock gifts to family
foundations and the time lag between the purported gift date and the date
the donor filed the donation with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), which did not hold true for CEO’s gifts of stock to other donees.50
This finding is consistent with backdating, as it implies that non-December
donations tend to be better timed when CEOs have a larger temporal range
of dates on which to report the gift. Yermack’s data also shows that for all
stock gifts, favorable timing is positively associated with the size of the
stock gift.51
Yermack drew a number of conclusions from these results. First,
many corporate executives opportunistically time their gifts on the basis of
inside information or backdate their gifts to increase the value of their
income tax benefits in the guise of charity.52 Second, less-than-charitable
motives illuminate the popular use of private family foundations as
recipients of charitable contributions.53 The majority of the family
foundations in the sample fail to follow the prudent investor rule of
investment management: the trustees, which are usually comprised of the
CEO and his family members, retain stock gifts instead of diversifying
their assets.54 Yermack’s conclusion indicates that there is “a surprising
mix of motives by corporate executives who make large charitable
contributions: while seeking to subsidize good works in society, they
simultaneously follow aggressive tax evasion strategies.”55
Professors Ghosh and Harjoto analyze the personal stock donations of
top executives and board directors in the United States for the 1993-2005
period.56 The study focuses on executives’ timing of stock gifts in relation
49. Id. at 121. Many of the CEO’s stock gifts occurred in December, which is when
most tax-motivated charitable donations are made. Many taxpayers wait until the end of the
taxable year to determine their charitable contributions once they have full knowledge of
their annual taxable income.
50. Id. at 117-118.
51. Id. at 108.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 109.
54. Id. The “Prudent Investor” rule, which grew out of the “Prudent Man” rule first
articulated in Harvard Coll. v. Amory, 26 Mass. 446 (1830), requires that a trustee “manage
a trust portfolio with ‘an overall investment strategy having risk and return objectives
reasonably suited to the trust’ and to ‘diversify the investments of the trust.’” See also Max
M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, The Prudent Investor Rule and Market Risk: An
Empirical Analysis 1 Harvard Pub. Law Working Paper No. 15-06, 2015,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2583775
[https://perma.cc/ZCD2CJXL] (“Under the rule a trustee must minimize idiosyncratic risk, align market risk with
beneficiary risk tolerance, and manage market risk exposure on an ongoing basis.”).
55. Yermack, supra note 1, at 122.
56. See Ghosh & Harjoto, supra note 17 at 347 (explaining that stock donations by
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to the shareholder returns and corporate social responsibility of their
companies.57 Ghosh and Harjoto separate stock price data into two groups:
stocks of companies where insiders make stock donations and stocks of
companies where insiders do not.58 They find evidence that corporate
executives opportunistically time their gifts to obtain tax benefits. The
price patterns around stock gift announcement dates support Yermack’s
inside information and backdating theories.59 They then analyze the
relationship between insider stock donations and returns to shareholders.
By comparing the “no insider donation” and “insider donation” data, they
find evidence that short-term and long-term returns of donating companies
are inferior to peers in which managers do not donate.60 This result shows
that stock donations provide personal benefits to executives but reduces
holdings of shareholders. Thus, executives’ personal donations of
company stock may be described as a principal-agent problem.61 Ghosh
and Harjoto also find that top executives make fewer insider stock gifts in
companies with stronger notions of corporate social responsibility.62 This
indicates that the more socially responsible the company, the less the
shareholders are harmed by executives opportunistically extracting
personal benefits from stock donations. This behavior is consistent with
stakeholder theory.63
II.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Federal Tax Laws
The tax benefits stemming from the charitable donation of stock
depend on the length of time the stock is held, whether the stock is closely
or publicly held, and whether the recipient of the gift is a public or private
insiders frequently work against shareholder wealth).
57. Id. at 343.
58. Id. at 347.
59. Id. at 348-49.
60. Id. at 349-50 (explaining that stock donations are triggered by self-interest and have
a negative effect on both short- and long-term shareholder returns).
61. Principal-agent problems refer to situations where the agents act to maximize their
own preferences and not those of the principal. In general, agents do not make the same
choices as would the principal. In the current context, when executives donate stock, they
look to maximize their personal benefit instead of that of their shareholders. See id. at 346
(applying agency theories to executives’ stock donations).
62. Id. at 351 (confirming that executives at companies with fewer indicators of
corporate social responsibility are more likely to make stock donations).
63. Id. at 354 (“[Corporate social responsibility] as a measure of fulfilling stakeholder
interest is associated with less likelihood and lower intensity of insiders’ stock donation,
which is consistent with stakeholder theory.”).
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entity. Generally, for charitable contributions of stock, any excess not
deductible in the year of contribution is carried forward for up to five
subsequent tax years.64 The contribution of any stock held long-term – that
is, for more than one year65 – permits the donor to deduct the fair market
value of contributed stock.66 The contribution of any securities held shortterm – for one year or less – limits the deduction to the lower of the donor’s
cost basis and the fair market value of the security.67
The contribution of long-term marketable stock to public charities
permits the donor to deduct the fair market value of the donated stock in an
amount up to 30% of the donor’s adjusted gross income (AGI), with a fiveyear carry-forward; cost basis is not taken into account.68 In the case of
short-term marketable stock contributed to public charities, the donor’s
deduction is the lower of donor’s cost basis and the stocks’ fair market
value, and is limited to 50% of the donor’s AGI.69 The fair market value of
the contributed marketable stock is the mean between the high and low
price on the date of the contribution.70
Taxpayers who contribute marketable stock to a private foundation
receive more limited tax benefits. Donors are subject to a maximum
deduction of 20% of AGI for contributions to private foundations.71
Generally, for contributions of stock held long-term, the donor is still
entitled to deduct the full fair market value of the donated shares; however,
if the donor contributes stock valued at over 10% of all of the corporation’s
outstanding shares, the deduction becomes the donor’s cost basis for the
additional amount.72 For contributions of short-term stock, the donor’s cost
basis deduction is limited to 30% of AGI.
Contributions of closely held stock to public charities or donoradvised funds are subject to the same deduction, AGI limitation, and carryforward rules as those for contributions of marketable securities. For
transfers of closely held stock to private foundations, donors are permitted
only a deduction equal to the lower of their cost basis or fair market value,

64. 26 U.S.C. § 170(d)(1) (2012).
65. See 26 U.S.C. § 1222(3) (2012) (defining long term capital gain as “gain from the
sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than 1 year, if and to the extent such gain is
taken into account in computing gross income.”).
66. Id. § § 170(a)(1), (e)(1), (e)(5).
67. Id. § 170(e)(1)(A).
68. Id. § 170(b)(1)(C).
69. Id. § 170(b)(1)(A).
70. 26 C.F.R. § 20.2031-2(b)(1) (2015).
71. 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(D) (2012).
72. Generally, for contributions of stock held long-term, the donor is still entitled to
deduct the full fair market value of the donated shares for up to 10% of the value of the
corporation’s outstanding shares. Id. § 170(e)(5).
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subject to a cap of 30% of AGI with the five-year carry-forward.73
Furthermore, if the donor claims a value in excess of $5,000 for the
donation of securities that are not publicly traded, the value of the donation
must be established by an independent appraisal conforming to Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) Regulations.74 In a nutshell, the appraisal must be
prepared by a qualified appraiser who has earned a designation from a
recognized professional organization.75 The appraisal must include a
description of the property transferred, the date of contribution, any terms
or conditions put on the property transferred, information on the qualified
appraiser, the basis for making the valuation, the appraiser’s signature, and
the date of the appraisal.76 Further, the appraisal must be made within 60
days prior to the date of gift.77 The donor must attach an appraisal
summary (IRS Form 8283), signed by both donee and appraiser, to her tax
return.78
The federal income tax law may also impose an “excess business
holdings” tax on private foundations.79 This rule limits a private
foundation’s ownership of voting stock in a particular corporation to 20%,
less the percent of voting stock owned by “all disqualified persons.”80 This
20% ceiling is increased to 35% if the voting control of the corporation is
effectively held by unrelated third parties who are not disqualified
persons.81 A private foundation that violates this rule will be subject to an
initial tax equal to 10% of the excess holdings.82 If the foundation
continues to have excess business holdings, it will be penalized with an
additional 200% excise tax.83
73. Id. § 170(b)(1)(C).
74. 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-13(c)(1)-(2) (2015). See also, id. at § 1.170A-13(c)(7)(xi)
(defining “publicly traded securities”).
75. According to the IRS Regulations, a qualified appraiser is an individual who (a)
“holds himself or herself out to the public as an appraiser or performs appraisals on a regular
basis,” (b) pursuant to 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-13(c)(3)(ii)(F), “is qualified to make appraisals
of the type of property being valued,” and (c) is not i) the donor, donee, or a party to the
transaction in which the donor acquired the relevant property, ii) any employee or relative of
any persons described in (c)(i), iii) any appraiser who performs the majority of her
appraisals for a person described in (c)(i). 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-13(c)(5). However, a person
cannot be a qualified appraiser if “the donor had knowledge of facts that would cause a
reasonable person to expect the appraiser falsely to overstate the value of the donated
property.” Id. § 1.170A-13(c)(5)(i)-(ii).
76. Id. § 1.170A-13(c)(4)(ii).
77. Id. § 1.170A-13(c)(3)(i)(A).
78. Id. § 1.170A-13(c)(2)(i).
79. 26 U.S.C. § 4943 (2012).
80. Id. § 4943(c)(2)(A).
81. Id. § 4943(c)(2)(B).
82. Id. § 4943(a).
83. Id. § 4943(b).
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The category of disqualified persons includes “any person . . . in a
position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs” of the
foundation, such as substantial contributors, officers, directors, trustees,
and related parties.84 Thus, a high-level corporate executive, such as a
CEO, who wishes to contribute her company’s stock to her own foundation
may be subject to the excess business holdings tax. The federal tax law
provides very limited safe harbors: 1) a de minimis exception that allows
the private foundation to hold up to 2% of the voting stock, regardless of
the percent of voting stock held by disqualified persons,85 and 2) a five-year
time frame for the foundation to reduce its excess business holdings if the
foundation receives the stock by gift or bequest before imposing the tax.86
The corporate insider benefits from the gift in two ways. First, the fair
market value of a gift of stock held long-term is deductible from her
taxable income, decreasing the overall tax paid. The tax benefits are
especially substantial for top-bracket taxpayers. A donor who is a
corporate executive is likely to be subject to the highest marginal tax
bracket of the Alternative Minimum Tax, which is currently 28%;87 thus
this donor would receive a federal tax benefit of 28% of the fair market
value of the stock.88 Second, the donor is able to escape the capital gains
tax on the difference between the fair market value of the stock and her
cost basis, which is particularly advantageous if the stock has significantly
appreciated in value.
B. Analysis of Liability under Federal Securities Laws
When the donor of securities is also a corporate insider, the question
of liability for insider trading becomes important.89 This Part addresses the
securities laws at issue with respect to potential liability for insider trading.
This includes Sections 16(b) and 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (1934 Act or Exchange Act),90 as well as corresponding SEC Rule

84. Id. § 4943(f)(4)(A).
85. Id. § 4943(c)(2)(C).
86. Id. § 4943(c)(6).
87. 26 U.S.C. § 55 (2012). An individual U.S. taxpayer must pay the lower of regular
tax and the alternative minimum tax. The AMT ostensibly limits the tax benefits available
to “taxpayers with high economic income.” Topic 556 – Alternative Minimum Tax,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc556.html
[https://perma.cc/Q2XC-3DDR].
88. The donor would potentially also benefit from any charitable deductions available
in state income taxes.
89. See infra notes 90-132 and accompanying text.
90. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 112-158, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp).
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10b-5.91 In addition, implications for the charity arising under SEC Rule
144, promulgated under the Securities Act of 1933, are discussed.
1. Short Swing Profits: Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act
The short-swing profit prohibition of Section 16(b) of the Exchange
Act does not permit corporate insiders to retain a profit from acquiring a
security and disposing of it at a higher price (or vice versa) within six
months.92 Section 16(a) requires that corporate officers, directors, and 10
percent shareholders publicly report all attainment and disposition of stock,
which includes gifts.93 This implies that a charity with at least 10 percent
ownership of a publicly traded company’s stock is also subject to Section
16.94
SOX provides further details regarding time requirements for
reporting. According to SOX, all open market sales and purchases must be
disclosed on Form 4 within two business days.95 SOX, however, did not
update the reporting rules for bona fide gifts of stock, which are subject to
less stringent requirements: gifts are reported on Form 5, which must be
filed within 45 days after the end of the company’s fiscal year.96 Yermack
finds that nearly half the executives in his sample delayed reporting their
gift beyond two business days.97 Importantly, current law provides an
exemption to insider trading liability for bona fide gifts. In proposing an
amendment to Rule 16b-5(a), which removed gifts from the scope of shortswing profit liability, the SEC stated that it believed “[b]ona fide gifts
represent less likelihood for opportunities for abuse.”98 This exemption
originated in Truncale v. Blumberg, where the court stated: “[b]y no stretch
of the imagination . . . can a gift to charity . . . when made in good faith and
without pretense or subterfuge, be considered a sale or anything in the
nature of a sale” within the meaning of Section 16(b).99
Furthermore, Section 16(b) requires that any insider’s “short-swing”
profit (the difference between purchase and sale prices for any two

91. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015).
92. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012).
93. Id. at § 78p(a).
94. Id.
95. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”), Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 403, 116 Stat. 745
(2002). See also infra note 167 (discussing the required disclosure on Form 4).
96. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3.
97. Yermack, supra note 1, at 110.
98. Id. at 111 n.8 (quoting Ownership Reports on Trading by Officers, Directors, and
Principal Stockholders, 53 Fed. Reg. 49,997 (Dec. 13, 1988)).
99. Id. (quoting Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F.Supp 387, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1948)).
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transactions within any six-month period) be forfeited to the company.100
The short-swing profit rule bars corporate insiders from acquiring a
security and then disposing of it at a higher price (or vice versa) within any
interval shorter than six months. But bona fide gifts to a charity are exempt
from Section 16(b) matching.101
Any charity that owns more than 10% of a publicly traded company’s
stock will be subject to Section 16.102 A donor who is required to report
under Section 16 and who transfers shares to a charity, including a private
foundation created by the donor and for which the donor serves as a
director, must report the transfer in the annual filing of (the more lenient)
Form 5, or voluntarily report earlier on Form 4.103 Ordinarily, assuming the
shares cannot be used for the donor’s benefit, the donor will no longer have
beneficial ownership in the stock once the charity owns the shares. The
charity will be the Section 16 reporting party as long as it owns at least
10% of the shares and the donor will no longer have any Section 16
reporting responsibility with respect to the transferred shares.
2. Anti-Fraud Provisions: Section 10b and SEC Rule 10b-5
Section 10b of the 1934 Act104 and corresponding SEC Rule 10b-5105
prohibit fraud “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”106
Unlike Section 16(b), there is no exemption for anti-fraud liability. Those
who violate this prohibition must disgorge any profit, may be liable for
damages, and may face criminal charges.107 A corporate insider making a
charitable gift and realizing a tax benefit may be in violation of Rule 10b-5
if the donation was made with knowledge of yet to be announced negative
news that will drive the value of the stock down shortly after the grant.108
As Yermack points out, although a charity could sue a donor under Rule
10b-5 if it relied upon the fair market value of the stock donated, such
litigation would have a “chilling effect” on future donations.109
There is a question regarding whether an ostensibly charitable transfer
100. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012).
101. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-5 (2012).
102. Exchange Act Section 16 and Related Rules and Forms, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
(Aug.
11,
2010),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/sec16interp.htm
[https://perma.cc/2Y46-YLRL].
103. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3(a) (2015).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
105. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5 (2015).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
107. Carole B. Silver, Penalizing Insider Trading: A Critical Assessment of the Insider
Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 1985 DUKE L.J. 960, 1007-1012 (1985).
108. Yermack, supra note 1, at 111.
109. Id. at 112 n.9.
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should be considered a sale under Section 10(b) of the Act. This question
has not yet been considered by the courts. The 1934 Act defines “sale”
broadly: “[t]he terms ‘sale’ and ‘sell’ each include any contract to sell or
otherwise dispose of [securities].”110 Therefore, the main question that
arises is whether the gift is a “sale” or is “in connection with” a sale for the
purposes of a violation of Section 10b and Rule 10b-5. To determine
whether a gift will be treated like a sale under the anti-fraud provision, case
law establishes a three-prong test: 1) change of ownership; 2) donor
receives consideration of pecuniary value; and 3) the treatment is
“consistent with the remedial purposes of the 1934 Act.”111 Furthermore,
there must be scienter, “meaning an intent to deceive, manipulate or
defraud.”112
Generally, the gift is not a sale as there is no consideration for the
donor for the transfer of the securities.113 Yet, the gift may be a disguise for
a sale if the donor receives some type of economic benefit from the
transfer. Courts have construed the personal benefit requirement quite
broadly, including elusive expectation of future economic gain,
improvement of friendship, or reputation.114 It can be quite easily argued
that the donor receives a personal benefit when making a gift, as there is a
tax benefit. A corporate insider who “controls or significantly influences”
the organization to which the securities are being donated is more likely to
be perceived by a court to have received a personal benefit.115
In addition, if the charity has knowledge of material inside
information through the insider, it follows that it should be prohibited from
transferring those shares until the information becomes public. If the
charity will immediately or shortly thereafter sell the securities, a gift may
110. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (2012).
111. Yermack, supra note 1, at 11 (citing Carol J. Sulcoski, Note, Looking a Gift of Stock
in the Mouth: Donative Transfers and Rule 10b-5, 88 MICH. L. REV., 604, 615 (1989)).
Generally, bona fide gifts of securities are not sales. Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140, 142
(2d Cir. 1949). A gift of stock is a “sale,” however, “when the purpose of the ‘gift’ is to
advance the donor’s economic objectives rather than to make a gift for simple reasons of
generosity.” Universalscience.com, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 7879, 2000 WL
1121540
(Aug.
8,
2000),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-7879.htm
[https://perma.cc/8RQM-DBCV]. So, for example, where a “free” stock distribution
benefits donors by attracting people to their website, the “gift” was deemed a “sale.” Id.;
see also Lawrence v SEC, 398 F.2d 276, 280 (1st Cir. 1968) (stating that there is no
significant difference between the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act with
respect to the definition of “sale.”). Further, by using the word “include” rather than
“means,” the term “sale” is defined broadly under the Securities Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. §
78c(14) (2012).
112. Id. (citing Sulcoski, supra note 111, at 623-24).
113. Tulli, supra note 89.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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be an action “in connection with” a sale of securities, making the donor
This establishes a similar tipper and tippee
potentially liable.116
relationship to that discussed in Dirks v. SEC,117 where the Supreme Court
stated that “[t]he tip and trade resemble trading by the insider himself
followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.”118 Therefore a corporate
insider’s gift of securities that are then quickly sold seems to resemble
tipping with a prompt trade and thus could be in violation of Rule 10b-5 for
both parties.119
Although research has disclosed no court opinions specifically
addressing when a charitable donation may constitute a “sale” within the
context of insider trading, the SEC has brought a number of actions in
federal court based on, at least in part, claims of illicit profits by insiders
through charitable donations of stock. For example, in SEC v. Zomax,120
the SEC successfully brought an insider-trading action against executives
who sold stock through a charitable remainder annuity trust. The SEC filed
a civil injunction alleging that James T. Anderson, the former Chairman of
the Board of Directors and CEO, and his wife, Michelle Bedard-Anderson,
the former Executive Vice-President of Sales and Marketing of Zomax,
violated securities laws when they liquidated their 821,250 shares of stock
on the basis of material, non-public information that the company’s
revenue and earnings would be considerably lower than expected in the
third quarter of 2000.121 The two executives sold hundreds of thousands of
shares in August 2000 on the open market, and later used the Jim and
Mikki Anderson Charitable Reminder Annuity Trust (the Trust) to sell the
rest. By doing so, the two allegedly avoided $9 million in losses. The
Commission also claims that Anderson tipped his friend to sell shares of
the company as well.122
The SEC argued that Zomax violated Section 10(b) and 13(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rules 10b-5, 12b-20, and 13a-13
when it filed a materially misstated Form 10-Q.123 In addition, it claimed
Anderson and James Flaherty, Zomax’s previous CFO, violated Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when they made material misstatements or omissions
and aided and abetted Zomax in violating Section 13(a) and Rules 12b-20

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
2005).
121.
122.
123.

Id.
463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983).
. Id.
Id.
Zomax, Inc. et al., Exchange Act Release No. 19262, 2005 WL 1384084 (June 9,
Id.
Id.
Id.
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and 13a-13.124 It further alleged Anthony Angelini, Zomax’s former COO
and President, also aided and abetted Zomax’s violations and that
Anderson, his wife, friend, and the Trust violated Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 by
trading the securities and tipping others.125 Anderson was also said to have
violated Section 16(a) of the Exchange Act and rules promulgated
thereunder when he failed to report the sales of the stock by the Trust.
Zomax, Flaherty, and Angelini consented to the permanent injunction
against them without admitting or denying the wrongdoing.126 Zomax
agreed to pay $2 million dollars in civil penalties.127 Flaherty agreed to
disgorge over $16,000 (plus prejudgment interest) and pay a $75,000 civil
penalty, and Angelini agreed to disgorge over $43,000 and pay $50,000 in
civil penalties.128 Litigation against all other parties continues.
In another case, SEC v. Buntrock,129 the SEC alleged that “[t]hrough
the gift of inflated stock, Buntrock was unjustly enriched in form of the
increased tax benefit.”130 Buntrock, Waste Management’s CEO, gave a gift
of 100,000 shares to his college alma mater 10 days before the new
management stated that the previous year’s statements were inflated.131
The case was settled with entry of an injunction against future violations of
the Exchange Act and disgorgement.132
3. Rule 144
Rule 144 adopted pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933 applies to:
1) sales of unregistered stock (“restricted securities,” that is, shares that
were not issued in registered public offerings) and 2) sales of stock by
“affiliates” of a public corporation (“control securities”).133 Restricted
securities are subject to information availability, a minimum holding
period, and a variety of other requirements before they may be publicly
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Complaint – Demand for Jury Trial, SEC v. Buntrock, No. 02C 2180 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
26,
2002),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/complr17435.htm
[https://perma.cc/GJM3-V7FP].
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Buntrock,
Litigation
Release
No.
19351
(Aug.
29,
2005),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19351.htm [https://perma.cc/T2GY-PYMX].
133. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(1) (2015) (describing an “affiliate” of a stock-issuing
corporation as “a person that directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries,
controls, or is controlled by, or is under common control with, such issuer.”).
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resold without registration.134 For shares in reporting companies, the
required holding period is a minimum of six months after the shares have
been paid for fully, and for shares in non-reporting companies, the
minimum holding period is one year after full payment.135 Once the
restricted securities are donated to a charitable organization, the
organization is treated as having acquired the shares at the time they were
acquired by the donor.136
Even when the stock earmarked for donation is already registered, if
the donee organization is deemed to be an “affiliate” of the issuer
corporation (due to, for example, significant ownership of the issuer
corporation’s shares), Rule 144 requirements – other than the holding
period requirement – may apply to any subsequent sales of the stock by the
donee.137 It would not, however, apply to the gifting of the stock from the
donor to the donee.
III.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

A. Empirical Results
1. The Data
We obtain stock price information from Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP). The insider trading data come from the union of
the Thomson Reuters Insider Filing Data Feed (1986 to 2014) and
backward extensions using archived annual purchases from the National
Archives (1975 to 1995). Our sample includes U.S. common stocks that
are covered by all three databases. The time period is from January 1986
through December 2014. Our final dataset has over 9,000 unique
Committee on Uniform Securities Identification Procedures numbers
(CUSIPs) and over 200,000 observations.
The Insider Filing Database includes all trades reported to the SEC Ownership Reporting System. The data contains all open market gifts by
officers, directors, and beneficial owners (direct or indirect owners of more
than 10% of any equity class of securities) of publicly traded firms.138 To
134. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144.
135. Id. § 230.144(d).
136. Id. § 230.144; § 230.144(d)(3)(ii).
137. See Finale Rule – Rule 144, Securities Act Release No. 33-8869 (Dec. 6, 2007),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2007/33-8869.pdf [https://perma.cc/C63A-CSZR].
138. For most of the sample period analyzed here (prior to August 29, 2002), Section
16(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act required that insider gifts be disclosed within the
first 10 days of the month following the month of the trade. SOX modified insider trading
regulations in significant ways. For example, the new reporting requirement states that
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focus on executive gift-giving, we exclude all gifts by large shareholders.
Gifts are designated by the transaction code “G”. The final sample is
limited to firms for which stock return data are available in CRSP. In
addition, to address potential misreports and incorrect outliers, we use
cleansed data from Thomson-Reuters.
Our gift database also provides two dates associated with an insider
gift. The transaction date is the date of the actual gift giving, when an
insider donates the shares of their own company. The report date is the
date when an insider transaction is made public by the SEC. Although our
main emphasis is on the information content of insider gifts, we also
consider the report dates to analyze potential timing games by insiders.
2. Sample Characteristics
Table 1 shows the sample characteristics of our dataset. Our sample is
large and covers a 29-year period, from 1986 to 2014, inclusive. It
includes all gifts of their firms’ shares by all executives in all publicly
listed firms. As shown in Table 1, the overall sample contains gifts by
insiders in 9,676 unique firms from 1986 to 2014. The total number of
gifts equals 222,561. Given the comprehensive nature of our dataset, our
conclusions apply to all gifts by corporate executives and are not sample
specific.

insider transactions (including gifts) must be reported electronically by the end of the
second business day following the day on which the transaction is executed both through
EDGAR and corporate public websites. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”), Pub. L.
107–204, § 404, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
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Table 1 also shows that the average gift size is about 43,000 shares.
Gift size increases with the size of the firms. In small firms, gift size
equals about 35,000 shares, doubling to about 69,000 shares in large firms.
The total number of shares gifted is also large, equaling about 9.5 billion
shares: about 5.6 billion shares were gifted by top executives and the
remaining 3.9 billion shares by officers and directors. The average number
of shares gifted per firm is about one million shares. Insiders in large firms
appear to gift a lot more shares than insiders in small firms. The average
number of shares gifted by insiders in small firms equals about half a
million shares. This number rises about 15-fold to 7.4 million shares gifted
by insiders in large firms.
The average stock price of the gifted shares is about $30 during the
sample period. Consequently, the dollar magnitude of the total gifted
shares in our sample is about $300 billion per year. This large amount
makes the regulations about executive gift-giving important from legal,
economic, and policy perspectives.
3. Measurement of Abnormal Returns
To explore whether insiders time their gifts, we compute abnormal
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returns139 by subtracting the return to the equally weighted index of New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and
the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations
(NASDAQ) stocks from the returns for the stocks gifted by insiders.140
This approach controls for market movements and implicitly assumes that
average beta or risk-exposure is one. Given that our sample contains over
9,000 firms, this assumption is satisfied. Hence, abnormal return ARi,t for
stock “i” and day “t” is computed as:
ܴܣ௧ ൌ ሺܴ௧ െ ܴ௧ ሻ

for each firm “i” and day “t”,

Where ܴ௧ is the simple daily return on the stock “i” gifted by insiders
on day “t”, ܴ௧ is the daily return to the equally weighted index of NYSE,
AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks on day “t”. For each event date t, these
returns are first averaged across all gifting firms “i” to compute average
abnormal returns:

The average abnormal returns are then cumulated across the event
dates as follows:

These cumulative abnormal returns are then graphed to examine the
behavior of abnormal returns around gifting dates.141
139. The term “abnormal returns” refers to the movements on stock price that cannot be
attributed to market movements. They are abnormal in the sense that there are not explained
by normal market relation. See, e.g., Marilyn F. Johnson et al., In re Silicon Graphics Inc.:
Shareholder Wealth Effects Resulting From the Interpretation of the Private Securities
Reform Act’s Pleading Standard, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 773, 793 (2000) (defining abnormal
returns).
140. Although not reported here, using as the benchmark the total return to the S&P 500
index or to the value-weighted market portfolio instead of the total return to the equally
weighted market portfolio gives similar results. We prefer the equally weighted returns
because most of the firms in our sample are small firms and the equally weighted index of
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ firms is a better match for small firms.
141. For a discussion of event studies and calculation of cumulative abnormal returns,
see Brad M. Barber & John D. Lyon, Detecting Long-Run Abnormal Stock Returns: The

1154

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 18:4

4. Empirical Findings
At this point, it is useful to summarize our five hypotheses regarding
executives’ motivations for gifting their own company stock: 1) wait until
after the stock price has appreciated naturally to maximize their donation as
well as their tax deduction (passive-timing); 2) accelerate the good news
prior to the gifts to further increase their donation and tax deductions
(spring-loading); 3) delay the release of bad news until after the gifting of
the stock to again increase their donation as well as tax deductions (bulletdodging); 4) backdate the gift date in order to maximize their donation and
tax deductions (backdating); and 5) use material and undisclosed inside
information about the future prospects of their firm’s stock to maximize
their donation and tax deductions (inside information).
Next, we examine the evidence to determine which of these five
hypotheses best explain insiders’ behavior. Figure 1 shows the pattern of
abnormal returns for the overall sample period. To get a clear picture about
timing games, we provide abnormal stock price behavior before from one
year before (250 trading days) to one year after the gifting date. Figure 1
further confirms the timing games. Stock prices rise about 5.5%
abnormally relative to the market index during the one-year before
executives gift their stock. Hence, if the overall market was up, the gifted
stocks rose 5.5% more than the market. If the overall market was down,
the gifted stocks fell 5.5% less than the market during this period.
Following the gifting date, stock prices fall abnormally by about 5%
relative to the overall stock market. The absolute maximum stock price
occurs on the precise day of the gift.

Empirical Power and Specification of Test Statistics, 43 J. FIN. ECON. 341 (1997); S.P.
Kothari & Jerold B. Warner, Measuring Long-Horizon Security Price Performance, 43 J.
FIN. ECON. 301 (1997); John D. Lyon, Brad M. Barber & Chich-Ling Tsai, Improved
Methods for Tests of Long-Run Abnormal Stock Returns, 54 J. FIN. 165 (1999); Mark J.
Mitchell & Erik Stafford, Managerial Decisions and Long-Term Stock Price Performance,
73 J. BUS. 287 (2000).
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Figure 1: Cumulative abnormal returns around executives’ gift
dates. Abnormal returns are computed using a market-adjusted
model. Day 0 refers to the gift day. Day 10 refers to the 10th trading
day after the gift date, while day -10 refers to the tenth trading day
before the gift date. Executives have the title of CEO, CFO, CI, CO,
CT, President, Chairman of the Board, Director, Officer, Vice
President, Vice Chair and members of the various board committees.

The conclusion from Figure 1 is that executives are able to avoid a 5%
decline in the value of their gifts by acting when they did rather than
accelerating or delaying another year. Hence, by carefully timing their
gifts, executives are able to increase the size of their gifts, and their
corresponding tax deduction by 5%.
This evidence is consistent with all five hypotheses. That stock prices
rise abnormally prior to the gifting date is consistent with both the passivetiming and spring-loading hypotheses. That the stock prices drop
abnormally after the gifting date is consistent with the bullet-dodging,
backdating and inside information hypotheses. To further distinguish
among our five different hypotheses and to see if any of them could be
rejected, we conducted the additional tests described below.
In Figure 2, we group our sample by the role of the executives into
two separate groups: 1) top executives, including the CEO, CFO, and
Chairperson of the Board of Directors and 2) all other executives including
officers and directors. All shareholders without executive titles are
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excluded. Figure 2 shows a similar picture for both officers and top
executives. Stock prices run up more prior to top executives’ gifting dates
and they decline less after the top executives’ gifting dates. Hence, this
evidence tells us that all insiders, regardless of title, use similar devices to
time their gifts.

Figure 2: Cumulative abnormal returns around executives’ gift
dates. Abnormal returns are computed using a market-adjusted
model. Day 0 refers to the gift day. Day 10 refers to the 10th trading
day after the gift date, while day -10 refers to the tenth trading day
before the gift date. Executives have the title of CEO, CFO, CI, CO,
CT, President, Chairman of the Board, Director, Officer, Vice
President, Vice Chair and members of the various board committees.
Top executives are defined as CEO, CFO, CI, CO, CT, President,
and Chairman of the Board.

In Figure 3, we group our sample by decades to explore the timeseries properties of executive gift-giving decade by decade. During the
first decade of our sample, 1986-1994, executives appear to gift stocks
when the stock price was declining by about 7% prior to the gift date.
After the gift date, stock prices continue their decline and fall another 17%.
This evidence of the decade of 1986-1994 is inconsistent with the natural
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timing and spring-loading hypotheses, but consistent with the other three.

Figure 3: Cumulative abnormal returns around executives’ gift
dates. Abnormal returns are computed using a market-adjusted
model. Day 0 refers to the gift day. Day 10 refers to the 10th trading
day after the gift date, while day -10 refers to the tenth trading day
before the gift date. Executives have the title of CEO, CFO, CI, CO,
CT, President, Chairman of the Board, Director, Officer, Vice
President, Vice Chair and members of the various board committees.

During the second decade (1995-2004), stock prices rise abnormally
by about 6% during the one-year before the gift date. Gifting takes place at
the maximum relative stock price. Furthermore, the stock prices fall
abnormally by about 6% during the one-year after the gifting date. This
decade appears to be characterized by a classic pump-and-dump pattern.142
142. This evidence suggests that executives donate stocks that are experiencing extreme
declines in price as the stock price falls abnormally by about 30% over the two years. The
perpetrator of a classic pump and dump scheme “pumps” the price of a stock by misleading
the public about the future profits or health of the company; after the market has absorbed
this misleading information and it is reflected in the stock price, the perpetrator “dumps” her
position and realizes a gain. Meanwhile, the price often reverts to what it was before the
misleading information was injected into the market. David B. Kramer, The Way It Is and
the Way It Should Be: Liability Under §10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5
Thereunder for Making False and Misleading Statements as Part of a Scheme to “Pump and
Dump” a Stock, 13 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 243, 245-46 (2005).
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This evidence is again consistent with all five hypotheses.
During the most recent decade (2005-2014), stock prices rise by about
9% prior to the gifting date and they fall about 1% after the gifting date.
The gifting still takes place near the maximum prices, at least in the shortrun. This picture suggests that recent scandals and publicity about
backdating may have played a role in influencing executives to scale back
in some of the timing games they play around the gifting of their stock.
This evidence is most consistent with the natural timing and spring-loading
hypotheses.
Next we explore the relation between the size of the gifts and potential
timing games. This evidence is shown in Figure 4, which indicates a strong
relation between the number of shares gifted and the price patterns. Large
gifts (greater number of shares gifted) appear to be associated with larger
stock price increases before the gift date, while smaller gifts are associated
with bigger stock price declines after the gift date. Stock prices rise the
most (by about 10% abnormally) for the largest category of more than
100,000-shares gifted (approximately more than $3 million). The increase
in stock prices is smaller for the fewer-share groups. For the smallest share
groups, stock prices rise abnormally by about 5%.
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Figure 4: Cumulative abnormal returns around executives’ gift
dates. Abnormal returns are computed using a market-adjusted
model. Day 0 refers to the gift day. Day 10 refers to the 10th trading
day after the gift date, while day -10 refers to the tenth trading day
before the gift date. Executives have the title of CEO, CFO, CI, CO,
CT, President, Chairman of the Board, Director, Officer, Vice
President, Vice Chair and members of the various board committees.

The post-gift-date stock price behavior also depends on the size of the
gift. For the largest size category, stock prices do not decline at all. For
the smallest share-categories, stock prices decline between 4% and 7%
during the year after the giving date.
The evidence shown in Figure 4 indicates that the motivation behind
gift-giving may be different depending on the amount of the gift. For small
and mid-sized gifts (up to about $3 million or less), executives not only
receive a larger deduction as a result of the gift, but they also avoid the
subsequent stock price decline. This evidence is consistent with all five
hypotheses.
For very large gifts (more than $3 million), there is no subsequent
stock price decline. In this case, the gifting individuals are simply able to
take a larger deduction by giving recently appreciated stock. This evidence
is most consistent with natural timing and spring-loading hypotheses.
To explore the backdating hypothesis in more detail, we group our
sample by reporting delays as shown in Figure 5. Because reporting
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requirements for gifts changed in September 2002 due to SOX, we restrict
our attention in Figure 5 to gifts reported after September 1, 2002.143 In the
post-SOX period, our sample contains 83,909 gifts with valid transaction
and reporting dates.

Figure 5: Cumulative abnormal returns around executives’ gift
dates. Abnormal returns are computed using a market-adjusted
model. Day 0 refers to the gift day. Day 10 refers to the 10th trading
day after the gift date, while day -10 refers to the tenth trading day
before the gift date. Executives have the title of CEO, CFO, CI, CO,
CT, President, Chairman of the Board, Director, Officer, Vice
President, Vice Chair and members of the various board committees.
Reporting delays (lags) are computed from the gift date to the SEC
receipt date. Time period is restricted to post September 1, 2002
period.

Our backdating hypothesis suggests that if executives engage in fraud
and backdate their gifts, then these gifts will necessarily appear to be
reported with delays, even if in reality they are reported promptly.
143. Before the enactment of SOX in 2002, corporate insiders had between 10 days and
40 days to report their gifts to the SEC (they could report by the 10th day of the following
month in which the gift took place).
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Furthermore, the greater the reporting delay, the greater the degree of
fraud.
To explain this further, an example may be useful. Suppose that
executives decide to gift their stock on March 2, when the stock price is
$50. Also suppose that the stock price started at about $50 last April and
had risen to a peak of $100 on January 2 before declining back to $50 at the
time of gifting in March. In order to maximize their donation, suppose that
executives report January 2 as the date of their donation and take a tax
deduction for the trading price on that date, when the stock price was $100.
Executives then immediately report their donation in March on Form 4 to
the SEC without any further delays.
At this point, anyone examining Form 4 who is unaware of the fraud
committed by the executive will deduce the following: 1) executives
donated $100 worth of stock on January 2 and 2) executives reported this
donation on March 2 with a two month delay. Consequently, all that can
be inferred is a late-reported gift. Furthermore, given that gifts are allowed
to be reported late in general, these delayed filings should not raise any
suspicion.
To the extent executives go back into stock price history and backdate
their donations, these gifts will be necessarily associated with reporting
delays. Furthermore, to the extent executives go further back into stock
price history to find even higher stock prices in the past, those with greater
delays will have a bigger peaks and bigger declines (ex-post). Thus, the
greater the reporting delays, the greater degree of fraud.
Our evidence is consistent with backdating. First, although not shown
in the figure, many gift transactions are reported with significant delay,
taking advantage of an exemption created by SOX, which allows
executives to report gift transactions on Form 5 (instead of Form 4) up to
45 days after the end of the fiscal year. In our sample, of the total of
83,909 observations post-September 1, 2002 where gifting and reporting
dates are both available, 53,379 observations involve delayed reporting.
This corresponds to almost two-thirds of the entire sample. Although legal
under SOX, this high proportion of delayed reporting certainly raises a red
flag.
Second, the evidence in Figure 5 indicates a relation between
reporting time lags and the inverse-V-shaped stock price patterns. In the
promptly reported group (33,487 observations), stock prices rise about 7%
prior to the gift date and they decline 1% to 1.5% during the one-year after
gifting. For those gifts with short reporting delays of 3 to 20 days (19,892
observations), stock prices rise about 6.5% prior to the gift date and they
decline between 0.5% and 1% during the one-year after gifting. Finally,
for those gifts with long reporting delays of more than 20 days (30,520
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observations), stock prices rise about 6% prior to the gift date and they
decline between 2% to 2.5% during the one-year after gifting.144
That those gifts with the greatest reporting delays show the greatest
stock price declines after the gift date is consistent with the backdating
hypothesis. Furthermore, that there are over 30,000 observations during
the past 12 years in this category indicates that backdating could still be a
problem with the timing of gifts. Overall, our evidence suggests that
executives are likely exploiting the delayed reporting provision available
under SOX to backdate their gifts. This finding indicates that immediate
policy intervention is necessary to bring executive stock donations into
compliance with anti-fraud statutes.
As an additional test of backdating, we also classify the gifts by the
abnormal stock returns around the gift date. Since backdating involves
picking a date with the highest stock price, we group gifts into two
categories, one showing an abnormal stock price decline 30-days before the
grant date, and the other showing an abnormal stock price increase during
the 30 days before the grant date. The backdating hypothesis predicts that
the group with a stock price increase should show a greater stock price
decline subsequently.
The evidence is shown in Figure 6. Consistent with the backdating
hypothesis, the group with a prior 30-day stock increase shows about a
7.7% drop during the next 250 days. In contrast, the group with a prior 30day stock price decline before the grant date shows only a 6.2% drop
during the next 250 days. Once again, this evidence corroborates the
conclusion that at least some gifts grants are still likely backdated.

144. The overall sample period shows stronger evidence of backdating. For the overall
period, the promptly reported gifts show a 2% subsequent decline. For gifts reported
between 3 and 20 days, the decline is 4.6%. For late reported gifts with more than 20 days
of delay, the decline is 5.1%.
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Figure 6: Cumulative abnormal returns around executives’ gift
dates. Abnormal returns are computed using a market-adjusted
model. Day 0 refers to the gift day. Day 10 refers to the 10th trading
day after the gift date, while day -10 refers to the tenth trading day
before the gift date. Executives have the title of CEO, CFO, CI, CO,
CT, President, Chairman of the Board, Director, Officer, Vice
President, Vice Chair and members of the various board committees.
Reporting delays are computed from the gift date to the SEC receipt
date. If the 30 day cumulative abnormal return from day -30 to day
-1 is positive, then prior return is classified as “Up.” If the 30-day
cumulative abnormal return from day -30 to day -1 is negative, then
prior return is classified as “Down.” Time period is restricted to
post September 1, 2002 period.

B. Legal Implications of the Study
As described above, our study demonstrates that all five of our
hypotheses may be in play in various ways. That is, the results can be
explained by executives whom have 1) waited until after the stock has
appreciated naturally to maximize their donation as well as their tax
deduction (passive-timing); 2) accelerated the good news prior to the gifts
to further increase their donation and tax deductions (spring-loading); 3)
delayed the release of bad news until after the gifting of the stock to again
increase their donation as well as tax deductions (bullet-dodging); 4)
backdated the gift date in order to maximize their donation and tax
deductions (backdating); and 5) used material and undisclosed inside
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information about the future prospects of their firm’s stock to maximize
their donation and tax deductions (inside information). The legal
implications of these hypotheses are analyzed below.
1. Waiting for Natural Appreciation of Stock Value
The first behavior that may explain some executive gift timing,
waiting until the stock appreciates naturally then making a donation, does
not raise any of the tax or securities law issues described in Part IIB above.
Although this pattern provides a way for the owner of securities to avoid
paying capital gains on the appreciation, this is no different than donating
other property that has appreciated in value. This would be a legally
appropriate way for an insider to donate stock to a charity.
Under federal tax law, charitable contributions receive significant
preferred treatment. The charitable deduction, which is available to
corporations and individuals who choose to itemize their deductions, has
continued to be one of the largest federal tax expenditures in terms of
estimated revenue cost.145 This tax subsidy ostensibly motivates donors to
provide financial support for a variety of organizations that the U.S. Tax
Code has designated as charities.146 The tax preference is greater for
higher-income individuals because the amount of the charitable deduction
is a function of the donor’s marginal tax bracket.147
Donating appreciated property, such as stock that has increased in
value, provides further tax advantages by allowing the donor to avoid
paying capital gains tax on the appreciation.148 Furthermore, charitable
contributions of appreciated property are treated differently from other
transfers of appreciated property because the allowable deduction is equal
to the fair market value of the entire property, rather than the difference
between fair market value and basis – that is, cost basis is disregarded for
purposes of the charitable deduction.149
Although recent studies have shown that the tax deduction for
charitable giving may be an inefficient tax subsidy,150 there is no debate
about its legality. Maximizing one’s charitable deduction by waiting for
the value of stock to appreciate before donating it is comparable to
maximizing one’s stock option compensation by waiting for the underlying
145. Joseph J. Cordes, Re-Thinking the Deduction for Charitable Contributions:
Evaluating the Effects of Deficit-Reduction Proposals, 64 NAT’L TAX J. 1001, 1001 (2011).
146. Id. at 1002.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2012).
150. See Cordes, supra note 145 (discussing various criticisms of the tax subsidy for
charitable contributions).
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stock to appreciate before exercising the option. In both scenarios, the
owner of the relevant securities does not take any steps to mislead the
public, nor does she use any material inside information to increase her
personal wealth. Waiting for stock to appreciate naturally before donating
it to charity is consistent with the 1933 and 1934 Acts’ “philosoph[ies] of
full disclosure.”151
2. Spring-Loading and Bullet-Dodging
The second and third hypotheses of executive behavior, accelerating
good news prior to the gifts, or spring-loading, and delaying the release of
bad news, or bullet-dodging, raise securities law concerns. These
behaviors have not been without controversy when occurring in the context
of dating games played to maximize executive compensation through stock
options.152 In the options context, spring-loading refers to the practice of
either manipulating the date of the options grant so that it occurs just before
information is released or delaying the release of positive information to a
date just after the option is granted. In either case, the executive’s stock
options become immediately more valuable after the release of good news.
This is analogous to spring-loading the donation of securities, in that the
executive is manipulating information to the market in order to make the
gift of stock provide greater personal benefit – in this case, a higher tax
deduction – although the practice involves acceleration of the release of
positive information rather than delay.
Bullet-dodging, in the context of the grant of executive stock options,
refers to the practice of accelerating the release of bad news to just before
the grant of options, or manipulating the grant date of the option so that the
option is granted just after the release of bad news. Our data shows
analogous behavior with respect to the executives’ gifting of securities,
except that rather than accelerate the release of bad news, the news is
delayed until after the gift, yielding a higher tax deduction than the
executive would be afforded had the news been released prior to the gift.
It would seem against the legislative intent of the federal securities
laws to allow executives to manipulate information flow to shareholders
solely for personal benefit. Indeed, one of the major purposes of the 1934
Act was the hope of Congress to curb an “unscrupulous insider . . . [from
Increased
using] inside information for his own advantage.”153
151. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 187 (1963).
152. See Matthew E. Orso, Comment, “Spring-Loading” Executive Stock Options: An
Abuse in Need of a Federal Remedy, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 629 (2009) (examining remedies
the government could use to regulate the practice of spring-loading).
153. H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 13 (1934).
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transparency was a key motivator of the 1934 Act: “devices designed to
create a misleading appearance of activity with a view to enticing the
unwary into the market on the hope of quick gains” were explicitly
frowned upon,154 and Congress called on “the corporate managers of
companies whose securities are publicly held of their responsibilities as
trustees for their corporations”155 to spur a renewal of investor confidence.
Executives who engage in spring-loading and bullet-dodging practices –
whether in the context of executive stock options or charitable
contributions of stock – harm investor confidence by deliberately
misrepresenting the value of their stock. Decreased investor confidence
may also lead to stock values plummeting; therefore, stockholders may
have a viable argument that executives’ manipulation of information flow
to increase their own tax deductions runs contrary to executives’ fiduciary
duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders.156
Assuming that charitable contributions of stock could be viewed as
disguised sales, bullet-dodging and spring-loading contributions should
violate Rule 10b-5’s anti-fraud provisions. Bullet-dodging – the practice of
withholding negative information until after the gift is made – is
particularly egregious because it involves actively concealing material
information from the public. It also artificially inflates the value of the
donation at the time it is made; the later release of the negative information
reduces the value of the stock in the hands of the charity, while the donor is
still permitted a high tax deduction for the contribution.
In addition, particularly with respect to bullet-dodging, the practice
also seems to run afoul of the rules of disclosing or abstaining from trading
as articulated by the court in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.157 In that case,
where stock options were at issue, the court found that the recipients were
required to disclose the positive information before accepting stock
options.158 It follows that executives should not be permitted to gift shares
of stock until the negative information in their possession has been
disclosed.
3. Backdating
Falsifying the date that a gift of securities was granted in order to reap
higher tax deductions is fraudulent behavior under the federal tax laws.
154. Id. at 10.
155. Id. at 13.
156. See id. (noting that one primary purpose of the bill is to “encourage the voluntary
maintenance of proper fiduciary standards by those in control” of registered companies).
157. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
158. Id. at 848.
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The IRS rules analyze the stock gift’s value on the actual transfer date.159
Backdating, in the charitable stock-gift context, occurs when the transfer
date of the stock gift is changed ex-post to artificially increase the amount
of appreciation and, in turn, the amount of the associated tax deduction.
Backdating of executive option grants was discovered simultaneously
by Professors Lie, Heron, Narayanan, and Seyhun, and reported in the
financial press as early as February 2005.160 Researchers showed that
managers falsified grant dates to receive options with lower strike prices.161
159. . See I.R.S. Publication 561 (Rev. 1) at 2 (Apr. 2007), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/p561.pdf [https://perma.cc/AHD7-FM83] (“If you deliver the certificate to a bank or
broker acting as your agent or to the issuing corporation or its agent . . . the date of the
contribution is the date the stock is transferred on the books of the corporation.”).
160. . See Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, Does Backdating Explain the Stock Price
Pattern Around Executive Stock Option Grants?, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 271, 271 (2007)
[hereinafter Heron & Lie, Does Backdating Explain] (finding significantly less abnormal
stock returns after SOX passed, and that “in those cases in which grants are reported within
one day of the grant date, the pattern has completely vanished, but it continues to exist for
grants reporting with longer lags, and its magnitude tends to increase with the reporting
delay.”); Erik Lie, On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards, 51 MGMT. SCI. 802, 803
(2005) (proposing that stock return patterns are due to awards being timed ex post facto so
that the grant date is set in the past); M.P. Narayanan & Nejat Seyhun, The Dating Game:
Do Managers Designate Option Grant Dates to Increase Their Compensation?, 21 REV.
FIN. STUD. 975, 1943 (2008) (presenting evidence of selecting an advantageous grant date
on a ex-post basis); M. P. Narayanan & H. Nejat Seyhun, Do Managers Influence Their
Pay? Evidence from Stock Price Reversals Around Executive Option Grants 31 (Ross Sch.
of
Bus.,
Working
Paper
No.
927,
2005),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=649804 [https://perma.cc/3GNS-DAXF]
(finding that executive options are backdated); M. P. Narayanan & H. Nejat Seyhun, Effect
of Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Influencing of Executive Compensation 23-24 (Nov. 2005),
(unpublished manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=852964 [https://perma.cc/VKS8DEGQ] (again finding that options are backdated and that SOX mandatory grant date
reporting decreases, but does not eliminate opportunism). See also Jesse M. Fried, Option
Backdating and Its Implications, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 853, 856-57 (2008) (stating that
“thousands of firms continued to secretly backdate options by weeks or months after SOX,
even though it entailed—in addition to other legal violations—a blatant disregard of the
Act’s two-day reporting requirement.”); Ritter, infra note 161, at 133 (explaining why a
company might backdate grants); Mark Hulbert, Test of Good Corporate Citizenship,
MARKET WATCH (Feb. 18 2005), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/timing-of-managersoption-grants-a-good-litmus-test [https://perma.cc/85P8-5DLD] (“It appears as though many
of them actually are back-dating the effective date of their option grants.”).
161. . Jay Ritter writes: “On January 19, 2000, when computer manufacturer Apple’s
stock closed at $106.56 per share, Apple announced that one week previously it had granted
options to buy 10 million shares to CEO Steve Jobs with an exercise price of the January 12
closing market price of $87.19. The January 12th close was the lowest closing price of the
two months prior to January 19. Seven years later, Apple admitted that the dates of many
options grants had been chosen retroactively, and that documents purporting to show that
the board of directors had approved the grants on the dates chosen had in some cases been
fabricated. Wealth transfers from option backdating can be large. For the January 2000
grant alone, if there was a 70 percent chance that the options would eventually be exercised,
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The stock price of the company would decline just before the exercise of
the grant and increase thereafter.162 Research conducted in more recent
years further suggests that managers are likely to make accounting
adjustments favorable to the CEO before option grant dates.163
Options backdating is a practice whereby the date of the option grant
is changed to a date prior to when the option was in fact granted. This
practice was even easier to execute when the SEC rules did not require
reporting of the issuance of stock option grants until after the end of the
fiscal year.164 This reporting delay allowed companies to wait until the
exercise price dropped relative to that day’s market price.165 The option
would then be backdated at its lowest point or near that point, so that this
lower exercise price could then be reported to the SEC.166 Backdating of
stock options thus allows the person who owns the stock options to realize
larger potential gains without requiring the company to show these gains as
compensation on the financial statement.167
Shortly after SOX was signed into law, the SEC changed its rule to
require option grants to be disclosed within two days of the grant.168 In
the difference between the January 12th and 19th dates for the exercise price was worth
almost $140 million to Jobs due to the difference between the $87.19 and $106.56 exercise
prices.” Jay R. Ritter, Forensic Finance, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 127, 131-32 (2008). See also
Heron & Lie, Does Backdating Explain, supra note 160, at 294 (attributing abnormal stock
price patterns to backdating); Randall Heron & Erik Lie, What Fraction of Stock Option
Grants to Top Executives Have Been Backdated or Manipulated?, 55 MGMT. SCI. 513, 524
(2009) (“We estimate that 13.6% of grants between 1996 and 2005 have been backdated or
manipulated in some fashion.”); Robert M. Daines et al., Right on Schedule: CEO Option
Grants and Opportunism 2 (Mar. 31, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (explaining that
abnormal changes suggest various methods of managerial opportunism).
162. This is illustrated by a V-shape on a graph.
163. See, e.g., Terry A. Baker et al., Incentives and Opportunities to Manage Earnings
around Option Grants, 26 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 649, 667-69 (2009) (explaining multiple
factors that affect managers’ incentives); Mary L. McAnally et al., Executive Stock Options,
Missed Earnings Targets, and Earnings Management, 83 ACCT. REV. 185, 212-13 (2008)
(summarizing information about managers’ and CEOs’ incentives regarding earnings
targets).
164. See Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, Testimony
Concerning Options Backdating at the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs (Sept. 6, 2006), https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2006/ts090606cc.htm
[https://perma.cc/6B4T-38TQ] (explaining that before SOX, “a grant in January might not
have to be disclosed until more than a year later.”).
165. See id. (explaining that companies “granted an ‘in-the-money’ option-that is, an
option with an exercise price lower than that day’s market price. . . . by misrepresenting the
date of the option grant, to make it appear that the grant was made on an earlier date when
the market value was lower.”).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3(g)(1) (2012). See also Final Rule: Ownership Reports and
Trading By Officers, Directors and Principal Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No.
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addition, this information must be disclosed electronically, allowing
shareholders access to the information almost instantly.169 Furthermore, the
SEC approved changes to the New York Stock Exchange and the
NASDAQ Stock Market listing standards, which require shareholder
approval of nearly all equity compensation plans.170 The terms of the grant
must be disclosed, as well as whether the option grant allows for the
exercise price to be less than the fair market value at the time of the
grant.171 However, the evidence in options backdating scandals also shows
that executives ignored the timely reporting requirements because the SEC
did not explicitly provide for penalties for late reporting. Thus, the SOX
requirements and the SEC Rule have been ineffective in controlling
executives’ incentives or their opportunities to backdate their option grants.
In December 2004, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
issued the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (FAS) 123R,
which again attempted to eradicate the accounting advantage of stock
options issued at-the-money.172 The Standards require that all stock options
granted to an employee be recorded as an expense on the financial
statements regardless of whether the exercise price is at fair market
value.173 In 2006, the SEC began to require all public companies to also
report information including:
the grant date fair value under FAS 123R (which is aggregated in
the total compensation amount that is shown for each named
executive officer); the FAS 123 grant date; the closing market
price on the grant date if it is greater than the exercise price of the
option; and the date of the compensation committee or full board
of directors took action to grant the option, if that date is different
than the grant date.174
Companies are also required to explain the goals and policies of the
executive compensation plans.175 Reports to investors must discuss
whether the company has engaged in backdating or might do so in the
34-46421, Sec. II.B (Aug. 27, 2002), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-46421.htm
[https://perma.cc/A4HT-373U] (describing the final rule and requesting comments).
169. Cox, supra note 164.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Fin. Acct. Series: Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123, FIN.
STANDARDS
BD.,
i,
1
(Dec.
2004),
ACCOUNTING
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document_C/DocumentPage?cid=1218220124271&accepte
dDisclaimer=true [https://perma.cc/CZ9V-Q9BL] (establishing standards for the accounting
of transactions in which equity instruments are exchanged).
173. Cox, supra note 164.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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future and, if so, how.176
In addition, in 2007, the SEC enacted rules requiring full disclosure of
all aspects of executive and director pay and benefits, including stock
options. These rules require the company to disclose the full amount of an
executive’s compensation in a single number, and whether a stock option is
backdated.177 If a stock option is backdated, the corporation must provide
the reason why. The goal of the rule is to make executive compensation
more transparent to the shareholders, thereby ending the practice of
executive backdating. However, as we demonstrate in this paper,
additional regulatory supervision is still needed to ensure the end of the
backdating practice.
Backdating gifts of stock involves many of the same economic and
legal concerns that arise with backdating executive stock options.
Although the link is less obvious than in the case of executive stock
options, backdating charitable gifts also weakens the link between
shareholder value and management incentives. Executives who backdate
their donations receive the benefit of a larger deduction, without providing
any corresponding performance for their firm. Furthermore, the treasury
and taxpayers in general lose when donors of backdated stock underpay
their taxes. In order to raise a given amount of revenue, other taxpayers
must pay higher taxes. To the extent that executive backdating practices
and the executive is denounced for tax fraud, the company may incur
litigation costs and costs associated with reputational damage, which in
turn harm the company’s investors.
4. Using Insider Information
The final hypothesis presented and evidenced in the data is the inside
information hypothesis: executives use inside information to time their
gifts for the highest deduction. For example, they may choose to donate
stock just prior to a negative announcement that causes the stock prices to
plummet. Unlike in the case of spring-loading, the insider-executive does
not necessarily manipulate the flow of information. She does, however,
time her stock donations based on material information that, at the date of
donation, is not available to the public. This behavior is analogous to the
type of insider trading that is prohibited under Section 10(b) of the 1934
Securities and Exchange Act.
As mentioned previously, insider trading cases are generally brought
176. Id.
177. Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Exchange Act Release
Nos.
33-8732A,
34-54302A,
IC-27444A,
at
17-18
(Nov.
7,
2006),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-8732a.pdf [https://perma.cc/8W4P-QQ2S].
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under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, which prohibits “any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” used “in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security,” and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder; or Section 16(b).178 Although Section 16(b) was initially
drafted with the express purpose of targeting insider trading, today it is
Rule 10b-5 that is more commonly used to bring insider trading cases.179
One of Congress’s primary concerns when drafting the 1934 Act was
“to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets[.]”180 In In re Cady,
Roberts, & Co., the administrative law court stated that Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 “are not intended as a specification of particular acts or
practices which constitute fraud, but rather are designed to encompass the
infinite variety of devices by which undue advantage may be taken of
investors and others.”181 In other words, even if nondisclosure of inside
information does not constitute fraud, it nonetheless “may be viewed as
a . . . practice which operate[s] as a fraud or deceit upon the purchasers” in
violation of Rule 10b-5.182 Although recent insider trading cases have not
read Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5 so broadly, the “disclose and abstain”
principle articulated in Cady, Roberts, whereby an insider in possession of
material nonpublic information must disclose the information before
trading, and further addressed in Texas Gulf Sulphur, still remains. In
addition to encouraging “vigorous market competition,”183 the “disclose or
abstain” rule promotes fairness to public investors.184
Using inside information to opportunistically time gifts of stock
presents similar problems of unfairness as insider trading “in connection
with the purchase or sale” of stock. The ability to maximize the value of a
tax deduction on the basis of inside information places insider-executives at
an unfair advantage relative to other taxpayers. Moreover, like many tax
loopholes, this advantage is available primarily to those in high income tax
brackets, creating skewed distributional effects favoring high-income
individuals.185 Other taxpayers are indirectly harmed by strategic timing of
stock gifts as they bear the brunt of decreased funding for government178. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
179. See Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L.
REV. 1, 56-57 (1980) (“The conventional wisdom is that Congress . . . expressed its concern
with insiders’ informational advantage by enacting section 16.”).
180. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2012).
181. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961).
182. Id. at 913.
183. Jennifer D. Antolini et al., Securities Fraud, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 983, 984 (1997).
184. Micah A. Acoba, Insider Trading Jurisprudence After United States v. O’Hagan: A
Restatement (Second) of Torts 551(2) Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1356, 1365 (1999).
185. Furthermore, “CEOs who make major stock gifts to family foundations tend to be
older and considerably richer than the general population of CEOs.” Yermack, supra note 1,
at 116.
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funded public facilities and services and higher tax rates than if the
charitable contributions had not been opportunistically timed.186 Further, to
the extent that executives often time stock donations just before a decrease
in the underlying stock price, the use of inside information to time stock
gifts is dishonest to the charities that receive the contributions and believe
that they are receiving something of greater value. Such behavior, if made
public, may lead to further erosion of investor confidence.
IV.

PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

Taxpayers are hurt by opportunistic stock gifting by insiders.187 Yet,
some argue that there is no easy solution. Executives often donate to take
advantage of the tax subsidies, and if there were stricter rules and harsher
insider trading liability, perhaps insiders would not donate stock as
frequently. Many studies conclude that donations increase substantially as
the availability of tax deductions increase.188 The government, however,
also has an interest in ensuring that gift tax exemptions are appropriately
applied for those donations that will serve the public good. Further, the
government has an interest in upholding the integrity of the securities
markets.
We thus propose four regulatory reforms to address these issues.
First, we propose that the delayed-reporting exemption given to the gifts
should be eliminated. Under current law, gifts can be reported up to fortyfive days after the end of the fiscal year. Our research finds that executives
are exploiting this exemption to backdate their gifts. We propose that the
reporting requirements for gifts be similar to any other insider transactions,
namely within two business days of the gift transaction. Second, we
propose increased penalties for late reporting of gift transactions. These
penalties should be stated as a percentage of the amount of the gift and
should increase with the number of days gifts are reported late. Third, if
any gift transactions are reported late, we propose that the executives be
required to explain the circumstances that led to the late reporting and
certify that the gift was not backdated.
Because insiders have an incentive to use inside information and use a
variety of manipulative games to time their gifts, spring-loading or bulletdodging must also be controlled. To address these issues, we suggest an
ex-post settlement device. Following the lead of the Private Securities
186. Joel Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion, 21 J. ECON.
PERSP. 25, 41 (1999).
187. Yermack, supra note 1, at 122.
188. See id. (“These studies generally conclude that donations to charity rise when the
availability of valuable tax deductions increases, especially for wealthy taxpayers.”).
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Litigation Reform Act of 1995, we suggest that a look-back provision be
implemented for tax deductions for insider gifts of stock.189 If the stock
price drops over the 90 days following the date of gift-giving, then the
average share price during the 90-day period following the gift should be
used for the purpose of the corresponding tax deduction, instead of the
price at the date of the gift. This provision will help de-incentivize both
inside information-motivated donations as well as spring-loading and
bullet-dodging. Executives would have little or no incentive to manipulate
information flow in the immediate short-term to increase the tax deduction
because the deduction allowed would be a value averaged over a 90-day
period.
CONCLUSION
This paper explores five non-mutually exclusive hypotheses regarding
how executives time the donations of their own firms’ stock: 1) wait until
after the stock has appreciated naturally to maximize their donation as well
as their tax deduction (passive-timing); 2) accelerate the good news prior to
the gifts to further increase their donation and tax deductions (springloading); 3) delay the release of bad news until after the gifting of the stock
to again increase their donation as well as tax deductions (bullet-dodging);
4) backdate the gift date in order to maximize their donation and tax
deductions (backdating); and 5) use material, undisclosed inside
information about the future prospects of their firm’s stock to maximize
their donation and tax deductions (inside information). The first timing
behavior involves no illicit behavior. However, as discussed above, there
are serious legal and policy issues raised by the other four behaviors.
Overall, we find that gifts are well-timed. Using a comprehensive
database of over 200,000 gifts during 1986-2014, our research
demonstrates that each of the five hypotheses, including the backdating
hypothesis explain at least some of the timing behavior of gift-giving in the
United States. Stock prices rise abnormally about 6% during the one-year
189. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995) (codified in various sections of 15 U.S.C.). The Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act (PSLRA) was enacted in response to concerns that large damage awards potentially
available in securities fraud class action lawsuits were encouraging the proliferation of
frivolous suits. See, e.g., Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 306 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Legislators
were apparently motivated in large part by a perceived need to deter strike suits wherein
opportunistic private plaintiffs file securities fraud claims of dubious merit in order to exact
large settlement recoveries.”). The PSLRA addresses this in part by a 90-day “look back
provision,” which reduces a plaintiff’s recovery to the difference between the purchase price
and mean price of the security at issue during the 90-day period after corrective disclosure.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e) (2012).
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before the gift date and they fall abnormally by about 5% during the one
year after the gift date. We find that this inverse-V shape pattern is
stronger for late-reported gifts, which is consistent with the back-dating
hypothesis. We also find that reporting of almost two-thirds of gifts is
delayed, thus exploiting an exemption given to them under SOX, further
contributing to the regulatory conditions that make it easier to manipulate
the timing of gifts.
Due to the differing behaviors that may be in play when gifts are welltimed and the difficulty in determining whether the motive is legitimate, we
propose relatively simple regulatory reforms to curb incentives for illicit
timing. Our policy recommendations should improve the compliance of
gifts with anti-fraud provisions and decrease tax fraud by eliminating the
exemption for late-reporting and imposing a penalty, as well as support the
general anti-fraud provisions of securities laws by imposing a 90-day lookback period for determining the stock value for purposes of the tax
deduction. Furthermore, these proposals should strike a balance among
competing policy considerations by continuing to provide incentives for
insider charitable donations of stock while at the same time reducing tax
and securities fraud.
Finally, in light of our data showing that stock returns following gifts
of insider stock are negative, a charity receiving shares of an executive’s
own firm’s stock as a donation might be well be advised to sell the stock
immediately, provided that the charity is not subject to Section 16(b). It is
probably also a good idea to institutionalize this rule for all stock donations
in order combat any resistance from the donors.

